New Wave of Cases Involving Investment Adviser Fees by Facciolo, Francis J. & Solon, Leland
St. John's University School of Law 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Publications 
10-4-2013 
New Wave of Cases Involving Investment Adviser Fees 
Francis J. Facciolo 
St. John's University School of Law 
Leland Solon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Securities Law Commons 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
 
Reprinted with permission from the October 4, 2013 edition of the  
New York Law Journal© 2019 ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. 
Further duplication without permission is prohibited. ALLReprints.com – 877-257-3382 – reprints@alm.com 
New Wave of Cases Involving Investment Adviser Fees 
 
Francis J. Facciolo and Leland Solon 
 
 
Shareholders challenging fees paid to the advisers of their mutual funds in civil lawsuits 
under §36(b) of the Investment Company Act face steep substantive and procedural 
challenges, but a recent decision from the federal district of New Jersey holds promise for 
private plaintiffs in this area. The central allegation in Kasilag v. Hartford Investment 
Financial Services1 was that the defendant investment adviser retained sub-advisers to 
perform substantially all of the investment management services for the defendant’s client 
mutual funds, and then charged its fund clients much higher investment management fees 
than what those services actually cost defendant. Based on these allegations, the federal 
district court denied the investment manager’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and allowed 
the shareholders’ lawsuits to proceed. 
 
The victory for the plaintiffs in Kasilag stands in contrast to the defeats of many other prior 
plaintiff shareholders who could not present convincing evidence that the challenged 
advisory fees were excessive. Forced to rely on speculative arguments as to what discovery 
would reveal, these plaintiffs often were unable to survive the crucial pretrial motion to 
dismiss stage, and, even if they did get past this stage, inevitably lost at either the summary 
judgment stage or trial. By highlighting the role of the sub-advisers, the plaintiffs in Kasilag 
were uniquely able to make a plausible showing that the defendant’s investment 
management fees were excessive under the circumstances. 
 
A prior recent case, Curran v. Principal Management, also involved similar but less detailed 
sub-adviser allegations than Kasilag. Reportedly settled in May 2013, Curran resulted in a 
2010 court decision2 denying defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a decision in 
which the judge even remarked that the plaintiff shareholders would probably be able to 
get past a motion for summary judgment. 
 
Standards Over Time 
 
The use of sub-advisers is becoming increasingly widespread in the investment 
management industry. While approximately 25 percent of funds employed a sub-adviser to 
manage at least a portion of the fund’s portfolio in 2000, that figure had grown to nearly 
40 percent by 2010. Although there have been no published court decisions3 featuring sub-
adviser allegations in the §36(b) context until Kasilag and Curran, we can expect more 
such cases in the future. 
                                                          
1 2012 WL 6568409 (D. N.J. Dec. 17, 2012). 
2 2010 WL 2889752 (S.D. Iowa June 8, 2010). 
3 Prior to Kasilag, HIFSCO was the defendant in an action brought by different shareholders who also 
argued that HIFSCO’s fees were excessive in light of their sub-advisory contracts: Southworth v. HIFSCO, 
No.1:10-cv-00878-RMB (D. Del.). Commenced in the District Court of Delaware in 2010, the Southworth 
plaintiffs withdrew their action “with prejudice” in November 2011. 
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For decades, the authoritative court decision interpreting §36(b) and its fiduciary duty 
provision was Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management.4 Decided by the Second 
Circuit in 1982, Gartenberg established the oft-cited precedent that, in order to impose 
liability on an adviser-manager under §36(b), the plaintiff must show that the fee “is so 
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered 
and could not have been the product of arm’s length bargaining.” Gartenberg stressed that 
all pertinent facts are to be weighed, and set forth a number of factors to be considered by 
a court in reviewing fees. The Gartenberg analysis, which has become a fixture of 
subsequent §36(b) decisions, includes consideration of the “nature and quality” of the 
services provided, the “rates charged” by other advisers, the adviser’s “cost,” the adviser’s 
“economies of scale,” and the conduct of the investment company’s board of directors. 
 
By rejecting a “reasonableness” standard for whether an adviser breached its §36(b) 
fiduciary duties, as urged by the plaintiffs, and instead adopting a standard that a fee is 
impermissible only if it is “so disproportionately large that it ... could not have been the 
product of arm’s-length bargaining,” Gartenberg erected a barrier that has proven virtually 
impossible to surmount. According to one article, in seven §36(b) cases that had been tried 
to final judgment by 2010, not a single plaintiff was able to prove that the challenged fees 
were excessive,5 although many cases do settle.6 Proving a violation of §36(b) presents 
many challenges. Comparisons between the fees charged by investment advisers to funds 
are usually not “apples to apples”: Some provide services that others do not, and different 
funds have different clients, who may need different services. Moreover, if (as some 
suspect), the entire investment management industry charges exorbitant fees, there is 
nothing to be shown by comparisons between advisers. 
 
After a divided 2008 Seventh Circuit panel rejected Gartenberg and ruled that a fiduciary 
“must make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap on compensation,” 
the Supreme Court in Jones v. Harris Associates 7  reversed and expressly approved 
Gartenberg’s “so disproportionately large” standard and factor analysis. Although the court 
concluded that Gartenberg was correct, some believe that Jones creates a change in §36(b) 
cases going forward. Whether that is true remains to be seen, but, if there is any shift, it 
may be due to the court’s comments regarding the investment company’s board of 
directors. According to Jones, when the board’s review process was “robust,” 
“commensurate deference to the outcome of the bargaining process” should be afforded, 
but where the review was “deficient or the adviser withheld important information,” the 
court must take “a more rigorous look” at the fee. In so urging, the court seemed to be 
applying a variation of the business judgment rule to the Gartenberg analysis, incorporating 
all the deference to informed board of directors’ decisions that comes along with the 
business judgment rule but placing a particular emphasis on the thoroughness and 
transparency of the board’s process. 
                                                          
4 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982). 
5 “The SEC’s Mutual Fund Fee Initiative: What to Expect,” 17 No. 1 WJDER 1. 
6 “The Downside of Judicial Restraint: The (Non-)Effect of Jones v. Harris,” 6 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. 
Pol’y 58 (reporting “the vast majority of 36(b) cases settle”). 
7 559 U.S. 335, 130 S.Ct. 1418 (2010). 





The arguments on the Kasilag defendant’s motion to dismiss occurred post-Jones. The 
plaintiffs were shareholders in six mutual funds advised by Hartford Investment Financial 
Services, LLC (HIFSCO). The crux of the plaintiffs’ complaint, which had previously been 
dismissed in part twice with leave to replead, alleged that HIFSCO paid sub-advisers to 
perform “substantially all’ of the investment management services that it provides to the 
Funds at a fraction of the fee” that HIFSCO charged the funds in which the plaintiffs were 
shareholders. According to the complaint, the management fees HIFSCO charged the 
Funds are, on average, three and sometimes more than five times “the amount HIFSCO 
pays its sub- advisors for substantially the same services.” In the year 2010 alone, plaintiffs 
alleged, this amounted to a profit to HIFSCO of nearly $100 million merely for 
“overseeing” the sub-advisers and administrative services (for which HIFSCO charged 
plaintiffs a separate fee). 
 
In denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the excessive fee claim, the Kasilag court 
evaluated the plaintiffs’ allegations against each of the Gartenberg factors, with the first 
factor, “Nature and Quality of Services,” being most important. The court stated that the 
information provided by the plaintiffs in the complaint, which included a comparison of 
the language in the contracts between HIFSCO and the sub- advisers with the language in 
the Investment Management Agreements between HIFSCO and the funds, indicated that 
these contracts were for “essentially the same investment management services,” namely 
“making investment decisions” and deciding “when to purchase or sell securities.” While 
HIFSCO countered that it did not delegate “extensive administrative and investment 
management services” to the sub-advisers, the court rejected these as “merits” arguments 
which were not appropriate on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
 
After its discussion of the first factor, the court continued its Gartenberg analysis over 
several pages, discussing several in detail and finding that many weighed in the plaintiffs’ 
favor. The role of the sub- advisers was the critical point, however, with the court’s opinion 
even suggesting that the plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the sub-adviser spreads were, by 
themselves, sufficient to state a claim under §36(b). Concluding its discussion of only the 
first, and before discussing four other Gartenberg factors, the court held that, “[a]ssuming, 
as Plaintiffs have alleged, that HIFSCO charged the Funds an average of three times what 
it cost to provide its investment management services, Plaintiffs have raised a plausible 
inference that HIFSCO’s fees are excessive under §36(b).” 
 
In addition to playing a key role in the “Nature and Quality of Services” Gartenberg factor, 
the allegations regarding the sub-advisers in Kasilag were also significant in the court’s 
evaluation of the other Gartenberg factors. At the heart of the second factor discussed by 
the court, “Comparative Fee Structures,” was the plaintiffs’ argument that HIFSCO’s fees 
were excessive compared to competitor Vanguard. Historically, courts have rejected 
arguments that a defendant’s fee was excessive compared to Vanguard, recognizing 
Vanguard as a unique, low-cost option in the industry. Going beyond the usually futile 
argument that the defendant’s fees were excessive merely because Vanguard’s were 
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cheaper, the Kasilag plaintiffs focused on the fact that HIFSCO and Vanguard retained the 
same sub-adviser to provide similar services for one of their respective funds. Vanguard, 
the court observed, appeared to pass the sub- adviser’s fees on to shareholders near cost, 
while HIFSCO, according to the complaint, apparently padded its investment and 
management fee more than 50 basis points for minimal oversight and administrative 
services. In light of these allegations, the court deemed the Vanguard comparison more apt 
than in the typical case, and entitled to some weight. 
 
The court also found the “economies of scale” Gartenberg factor weighed in the plaintiffs’ 
favor, also on the strength of Kasilag’s unique sub-adviser allegations. Other plaintiffs have 
argued that defendants do not pass on economies of scalefinancial benefits that accrue to 
the adviser when funds grow but the cost of servicing them remains relatively stableto 
shareholders, spacing fee reduction “breakpoints” so far apart that they are barely ever 
reached, and, in the event that they are, providing only a minimal fee decrease to 
shareholders. The Kasilag plaintiffs went further: they showed that, while HIFSCO offered 
only unattainable and immaterial breakpoint fee reductions to plaintiffs, HIFSCO had 
negotiated contracts “at arm’s length” with its sub-advisers for breakpoints that the court 
characterized as being “much more competitive” and beneficial to HIFSCO, thereby 
bolstering plaintiffs’ argument that HIFSCO’s non-arm’s length fees with plaintiffs’ funds 
were excessive. 
 
Cases and Reasoning 
 
In its ruling, Kasilag cited another §36(b) decision from an Iowa district court, Curran v. 
Principal Management. The plaintiffs in Curran, also a post-Jones case, were shareholders 
in a mutual fund of funds that only invested in other mutual funds in the same family as 
the defendant investment adviser. Similar to the plaintiffs in Kasilag, the shareholders in 
Curran also alleged that their funds’ investment adviser contracted with sub-advisers to 
provide “the bulk of investment advice” but charged plaintiffs several times more than what 
those services actually cost. In denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Curran court 
did not go into as much detail as Kasilag. It held, however, that the totality of plaintiffs’ 
allegations, including that the adviser charged more than the sub-advisers who allegedly 
provided the bulk of investment advice and did not pass on benefits from economies of 
scale, and that other institutional clients paid less for the same services, all “more than 
adequately” stated a claim under §36(b). 
 
Judge Renee Marie Bumb’s Kasilag ruling essentially credited the plaintiffs’ allegations 
that the investment management services subcontracted out were the most important and 
costly to provide, and that the additional services that defendant claimed to provide were, 
if not negligible, not enough to warrant their price and foreclose judicial scrutiny. In this 
manner, the Kasilag plaintiffs were able to provide the court with specific facts to support 
their claim that their excessive fee claim had meritnot an insignificant accomplishment 
given the high substantive hurdle §36(b) claimants face, and the “plausibility” Rule 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard imposed by the Supreme Court in recent years. 
 
The court’s comments in Jones regarding the board of directors process was not lost on the 
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defendants in Kasilag or Curran, and both pointed to information regarding their respective 
board’s process in support of their motion to dismiss. In their briefs, the Kasilag defendants 
claimed that their board undertook a “robust” process in approving the agreement, but the 
court did not mention these assertions in its decision. 
 
The defendants in Curran pointed to publicly available SEC documents that they claimed 
specifically outlined the steps the directors took in approving the fees at issue, but the court 
refused to dismiss on this basis, ruling that the defendants’ arguments warranted “a factual 
inquiry that would be inappropriate in the context of a Rule 12(b) (6) motion.” 
 
To the extent that Jones might have changed the 36(b) analysis to afford directors more 
deference based upon the board’s process, it was not helpful at the motion to dismiss stage 
to either the Kasilag or Curran defendants. If anything, the sub-adviser allegationswhich 
in Kasilag included HIFSCO charging the funds three to five times more for investment 
management services than what the sub-advisers charged HIFSCOappear to override 
anything that the board could have done, i.e., no rational board could approve such an 
arrangement. Indeed, the Kasilag court cited the sub-adviser spread in its discussion of the 
“Conscientiousness of the Board” Gartenberg factor, and ultimately found that this factor 
weighed in plaintiffs’ favor because this circumstance, among others, suggested that the 




Given the tendency for plaintiffs’ securities class action lawyers to imitate causes of action 
brought by other plaintiffs’ lawyers, we can expect to see more cases involving sub-adviser 
fees, future cases for which Kasilag will be an important precedent. Ultimately, the 
resolution of Kasilag may hinge on what additional services HIFSCO provided to 
plaintiffs’ funds, and whether they were enough to justify the enormous disparity between 
what the sub-adviserswho presumably already built a profit into their investment 
management ratescharged HIFSCO, and what HIFSCO charged the plaintiffs. Subsequent 
rulings in Kasilag, including any on the merits, will be ones to watch.8 
 
FRANCIS J. FACCIOLO is a professor of legal writing and assistant director of the 
Securities Arbitration Clinic at St. John’s University School of Law. LELAND S. SOLON, 
an associate at the Law Firm of Gary N. Weintraub, contributed to this article. 
                                                          
8 The attorneys representing the Kasilag plaintiffs have two other actions pending in the District Court of 
New Jersey involving sub-adviser allegations, both against the AXA financial group. Sivolella v. AXA 
Equitable Life Ins., Case 3:11-cv-04194-PGSDEA (filed July 21, 2011); Sanford v. AXA Equitable Funds 
Management Group, Case 3:13-cv-00312-PGS-DEA (filed Jan. 15, 2013). 
